Universal Communication Efficient Quantum Threshold Secret Sharing
  Schemes by Senthoor, Kaushik & Sarvepalli, Pradeep Kiran
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
09
22
9v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
21
 Fe
b 2
02
0
Universal Communication Efficient Quantum
Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
Kaushik Senthoor and Pradeep Kiran Sarvepalli
Department of Electrical Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Madras
Chennai 600 036, India
Abstract—Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is a cryptographic
protocol in which a quantum secret is distributed among a
number of parties where some subsets of the parties are able
to recover the secret while some subsets are unable to recover
the secret. In the standard ((k, n)) quantum threshold secret
sharing scheme, any subset of k or more parties out of the total
n parties can recover the secret while other subsets have no
information about the secret. But recovery of the secret incurs
a communication cost of at least k qudits for every qudit in the
secret. Recently, a class of communication efficient QSS schemes
were proposed which can improve this communication cost to
d
d−k+1
by contacting d ≥ k parties where d is fixed prior to
the distribution of shares. In this paper, we propose a more
general class of ((k, n)) quantum secret sharing schemes with
low communication complexity. Our schemes are universal in
the sense that the combiner can contact any number of parties
to recover the secret with communication efficiency i.e. any d
in the range k ≤ d ≤ n can be chosen by the combiner. This is
the first such class of universal communication efficient quantum
threshold schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation. A quantum secret sharing protocol enables the
secure distribution of a secret among mutually collaborating
parties so that only certain collections of parties can recover
the secret. Since the proposal of quantum secret sharing for
classical secrets by Hillery et al. [10] and its extension to share
quantum secrets by Cleve et al. [5] there has been extensive
research in this field [6], [8], [13], [14], [16], [18], [20], [21].
Quantum secret sharing schemes provide greater security than
classical secret sharing schemes [10]. Quantum secret sharing
has been experimentally demonstrated by many groups [1], [4],
[7], [9], [15], [19], [22], [24]. In this paper we are interested in
optimizing the resources needed for quantum secret sharing.
Specifically, we propose communication efficient quantum
secret sharing (CE-QSS) schemes.
The most popular quantum secret sharing scheme is the
quantum threshold secret sharing scheme (QTS). In this
scheme a minimum of k players are required to recover the
secret. It is often denoted as a ((k, n)) scheme indicating that
z ≥ k players out of the n players can recover the secret. Such
a scheme can share one secret qudit. The state given to each
player is called the share of the player. After the secret has
been shared the players who plan to recover the secret combine
their shares together and reconstruct the secret. Alternatively,
the parties involved in the recovery could communicate all
or part of their share to a third party designated as the
combiner. The amount of quantum communication is called the
communication complexity for recovery. The standard method
due to [5] requires the mn qudits to be shared for share
distribution and at least mk qudits for recovery.
The analogous problem of reducing communication com-
plexity has been studied classically [2], [3], [11], [12], [17],
[23] but not as much in the quantum setting. Only recently,
Ref. [20] showed that the quantum communication cost during
recovery can be reduced by using a subset of players whose
cardinality is more than the threshold required to recover the
secret. The gains can be significant and for a ((k, 2k − 1))
threshold scheme, they showed that the gains in communica-
tion complexity of recovery per secret qudit can be as large
as O(k). One limitation of those schemes was that these gains
were only for a subset of players whose size d was fixed.
Contribution. In this paper, we address the problem of design-
ing quantum threshold schemes that are universal in that any
subset of size d ≥ k would provide gains in communication
cost during recovery. Our schemes generalize the classical
schemes of [2], [3] to the quantum setting. We denote them as
((k, n, ∗)) schemes. In an earlier work [20], a construction for
((k, n, d)) communication efficient QSS has been proposed.
However, that construction only works for a fixed value of d
in the range of k < d ≤ n. The value of d is decided prior to
encoding of the secret and cannot be changed. When d parties
are contacted, the proposed construction achieves the same
communication complexity as that of fixed d. So there is no
loss in communication complexity with the increased flexibil-
ity to change d. This is the first such class of communication
efficient quantum threshold secret sharing schemes where the
number of parties contacted can be varied from k to n.
Notation. We define the two qudit operator Lα as
Lα |i〉c |j〉t = |i〉c |j + αi〉t , (1)
where i, j ∈ Fq and α ∈ Fq is a constant. The subscript c and
t indicate that they are control and target qudits respectively.
This operator generalizes the CNOT gate.
We take the standard basis of Cq to be {|x〉 | x ∈
Fq}. We denote |x1x2 · · ·xℓ〉 by |x〉 where x is the vector
(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ). The standard basis for C
qℓ is taken to be
{|x〉 | x ∈ Fℓq}. For any invertible matrix K ∈ F
ℓ×ℓ
q , we
define the unitary operation UK
UK |x〉 = |Kx〉 = |y〉 , (2)
where y = (y1, . . . , yn) and yi =
∑
j Kijxj . As the mapping
LK : x 7→ Kx is a bijection from F
ℓ
q to F
ℓ
q for any invertible
matrix K , clearly UK is a unitary operation.
Let A = [aij ] be an m × n matrix from F
m×n
q . Then
|A〉 indicates the state |a11a21 . . . am1〉|a12a22 . . . am2〉. . .
|a1na2n . . . amn〉. Let K be an invertible m×m matrix. Then
applying K to the state |A〉 is defined as transforming state
|A〉 to |KA〉 by U⊗nK .
Consider the matrices B1, B2, . . . , Bf where each of
these f matrices has the same n number of columns.
Then, we use the notation |A(B1, B2, . . . , Bf )〉 to denote
|A
[
Bt1 B
t
2 . . . B
t
f
]t
〉 and |B1, B2, . . . , Bf 〉 to denote
|
[
Bt1 B
t
2 . . . B
t
f
]t
〉.
We use the notation [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} and [i, j] := {i, i+
1, . . . , j}. Let V be a m×n matrix and A ⊆ [m], B ⊆ [n]. We
denote by VA, the submatrix of V formed by taking the rows
indexed by entries in A. Similarly, we can form a submatrix
of V by taking the columns of V . This is indicated as V B .
We can also form a submatrix V BA which takes some rows and
columns from V .
Illustration. In this section, we give an example to illustrate
the gains in communication complexity for a suitably designed
quantum threshold scheme. Later sections in this paper provide
a construction for such universal communication efficient
quantum secret sharing schemes. A running example for the
proposed construction is included in the paper.
Consider a secret of three qudits with each qudit of dimen-
sion 7. This secret will be encoded into 15 qudits, giving three
qudits to each of the five parties. Every qudit is of dimension
7. Define matrices V and M as follows.
V =


1 1 1 1 1
1 2 4 1 2
1 3 2 6 4
1 4 2 1 4
1 5 4 6 2

 and M =


s1 0 0
s2 r1 0
s3 r2 r3
r1 r3 r5
r2 r4 r6

 .
Then the encoding for a universal QTS scheme is given by
the following mapping
|s1s2s3〉 7→
∑
r∈F67
|c11c12c13〉 |c21c22c23〉 |c31c32c33〉 (3)
|c41c42c43〉 |c51c52c53〉
where r = (r1, r2, . . . , r6) and cij is the (i, j)th entry of C =
VM .
When combiner requests d = 5 parties, they send the first
qudit their shares, namely ci,1. When d = 4, the combiner
accesses the first two qudits of each share of the four parties
contacted. When d = 3, the combiner accesses all three qudits
of the share of the three parties contacted.
Consider the case when d = 5 i.e. the first qudits from
all five parties are accessed. Applying the operation UV −1 on
these five qudits, we obtain
|s1s2s3〉
∑
r∈F67
|r1r2〉 |c12c22c32c42c52〉 |c13c23c33c43c53〉 (4)
Consider the case when d = 4. Assume that the first four
parties are accessed. The first two qudits from the four parties
are accessed. Applying the operation UK1 on the set of four
second qudits, where K1 is the inverse of V
[2,5]
[4] we obtain∑
r∈F67
|c11c21c31c41c51〉 |r1r2r3r4〉 |c52〉 |c13c23c33c43c53〉 . (5)
Then, on applying the operators L6 |r2〉 |c11〉, L5 |r2〉 |c21〉,
L3 |r2〉 |c31〉 and L3 |r2〉 |c41〉, see Eq. (5), we obtain∑
r∈F67
|s1 + s2 + s3 + r1〉 |s1 + 2s2 + 4s3 + r1〉
|s1 + 3s2 + 2s3 + 6r1〉 |s1 + 4s2 + 2s3 + r1〉 |c51〉
|r1r2r3r4〉 |c52〉 |c13c23c33c43c53〉 .
Applying the operationUK4 on the set of four second qudits,
where K4 is the inverse of V
[4]
[4] , we obtain
|s1s2s3〉
∑
r∈F67
|r1〉 |c51〉 |r1r2r3r4〉 |c52〉 |c13c23c33c43c53〉 .
Then, on applying suitable Lα operators, we obtain
|s1s2s3〉
∑
r∈F67
|r1〉 |c51〉 |r1c51r3c52〉 |c52〉 |c13c23c33c43c53〉
= |s1s2s3〉
∑
r′∈F67
|r1〉 |r
′
2〉 |r1r
′
2r3r
′
4〉 |r
′
4〉 |c13c23c33c43c53〉 .
where r′ = (r1, r
′
2, r3, r
′
4, r5, r6).
In contrast, for the standard ((3, 5)) QTS due to Cleve et
al. 3 qudits need to be communicated for recovery of 1 qudit
of secret. In the ((3, 5, 5)) fixed d communication efficient
QSS scheme from [20], 5 qudits need to be communicated for
recovery of 3 qudits i.e 5/3 qudits per 1 qudit of secret. But
this scheme does not provide the flexibility of contacting four
parties communication efficiently. The scheme provided above
can solve that problem. It provides communication efficiency
at d = 5 and as well as d = 4. However, at d = 4, this
scheme gives communication cost of 8 qudits to recover secret
of 3 qudits i.e. 8/3 qudits per one qudit of secret whereas the
((3, 5, 4)) fixed d CE-QSS gives 2 qudits per one qudit of
secret. Our proposed construction below can provide the same
communication efficiency as the fixed d CE-QSS schemes at
both d = 4 and d = 5.
II. BACKGROUND
A quantum secret sharing (QSS) scheme is a protocol to
encode the secret in arbitrary quantum state and share it
among n parties such that certain subsets of parties, called
authorized sets, can recover the secret (recoverability) and
certain subsets of parties, called unauthorized sets, do not have
any information on the secret (secrecy). A QSS scheme is
called perfect quantum secret sharing scheme if any subset of
the n parties is either an authorized set or an unauthorized set.
We focus on the ((k, n)) quantum threshold schemes (QTS),
where there are n players and any z ≥ k players can recover
the secret while fewer than k players have no information
about the secret.
The realization of a quantum secret sharing is specified by
giving an encoding for the basis states of the secret. Any
encoding has to satisfy the properties of recoverablity and
secrecy to realize a valid QSS. The recoverability constraint
implies that any authorized set must be able to recover the
secret and the secrecy constraint implies that sets that are
unauthorized cannot recover the secret. In this paper, in
Section III-A, we describe the encoding for the proposed
construction of ((k, n, ∗)) universal quantum threshold secret
sharing scheme. In Section III-B, the proof for secret recovery
is given. In Section III-C, we show that our construction
satisfies the secrecy constraint.
III. UNIVERSALLY EFFICIENT QTS
A. Encoding
Communication efficient quantum secret sharing schemes
for particular values of k and n = 2k − 1 can be designed
to work for all possible values of d in the range k through n
where k ≤ d ≤ n. We introduce the following terms before
discussing the scheme. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
di = n − i + 1 = 2k − i (6a)
mi = di − k + 1, m = lcm{m1,m2, . . .mk} (6b)
ai = m/(di −k + 1) (6c)
b1 = a1, bi = ai − ai−1 for i > 1 (6d)
Here m is the total number of secret qudits shared. The total
number of qudits with each party is also given by m. This is
consistent with the fact that in a perfect secret sharing scheme
the size of the share must be at least as large as the secret [8],
[13].
Now ai gives the number of qudits communicated from
each accessible share when di shares are accessed to recover
the secret. This means that aidi qudits are communicated to
the combiner when di players are contacted. Let b1 = a1
and bi = ai − ai−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Pick a prime number
q > 2k − 1. Consider the secret s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ F
m
q
and r = (r1, r2, . . . , rm(k−1)) ∈ F
m(k−1)
q .
Entries in s are rearranged into the matrix S of size k ×
(m/k).
S =


s1 sk+1 · · · sm−k+1
s2 sk+2 · · · sm−k+2
...
...
. . .
...
sk s2k · · · sm

 (7)
Entries in r are rearranged into k matrices i.e. R1 of size
(k− 1)× b1, R2 of size (k− 1)× b2 and so on till Rk of size
(k − 1)× bk.
R1 =


r1 rk · · · r(a1−1)(k−1)+1
r2 rk+1 · · · r(a1−1)(k−1)+2
...
...
. . .
...
rk−1 r2(k−1) · · · ra1(k−1)


For 2 ≤ i ≤ k, Ri is given by

rai−1(k−1)+1 r(ai−1+1)(k−1)+1 · · · r(ai−1)(k−1)+1
rai−1(k−1)+2 r(ai−1+1)(k−1)+2 · · · r(ai−1)(k−1)+2
...
...
. . .
...
r(ai−1+1)(k−1) r(ai−1+2)(k−1) · · · rai(k−1)

 .
The matrix C, called code matrix, is defined as follows.
C = VM
where
M =


S
0
0
. . .
0
D1 D2 Dk−1
R1 R2 R3 . . . Rk


and V is a n × n Vandermonde matrix over Fq. Here, Di of
size (k− i)× bi+1 is constructed by rearranging the entries in
ith row of the matrix [R1 R2 . . . Ri].
The encoding for a universal QTS is given as follows:
|s1s2 . . . sm〉 7→
∑
r∈F
m(k−1)
q
n⊗
u=1
|cu,1cu,2 . . . cu,m〉 (8)
where cij is the entry in C from ith row and jth column. For
example, take k = 3. This gives
n = 2k − 1 = 5, q = 7
d1 = 5, d2 = 4, d3 = 3
m1 = 3,m2 = 2,m3 = 1
m = lcm{3, 2, 1} = 6
a1 = 2, a2 = 3, a3 = 6
b1 = 2, b2 = 1, b3 = 3
Let q = 7. Then C, the coding matrix for k = 3 is given as

1 1 1 1 1
1 2 4 1 2
1 3 2 6 4
1 4 2 1 4
1 5 4 6 2




s1 s4 0 0 0 0
s2 s5 r1 0 0 0
s3 s6 r3 r2 r4 r6
r1 r3 r5 r7 r9 r11
r2 r4 r6 r8 r10 r12

 .
Each entry in matrix C, cij is a function of s and r.
However, note that the Di are functions of r alone.
The encoding for the ((3, 5, ∗)) schemes is given by Eq. (8).
For example, the corresponding cij of the third share are given
below.
c31 = s1 + s2 + s3 + r1 + r2, c32 = s4 + s5 + s6 + r3 + r4,
c33 = 3r1 + 2r3 + 6r5+ 4r6, c34 = 2r2 + 6r7 + 4r8,
c35 = 2r4 + 6r9 + 4r10, c36 = 2r6 + 6r11 + 4r12.
Our encoding matrix is somewhat similar to the matrix used
in [2], [3]. However, there are some minor structural differ-
ences. Since we encoding quantum states in superposition,
there is no need for generating random bits. Furthermore, due
to the No-Cloning theorem, the total number of parties cannot
exceed 2k − 1.
B. Reconstruction of the secret
The combiner can reconstruct the secret depending upon
the choice of d. Once d = di is chosen, the combiner contacts
a set of any di parties to reconstruct the secret. Each of the
contacted party sends ai =
m
di−k+1
qudits to the combiner. In
total, the combiner has dim
di−k+1
= aidi qudits.
With respect to the ((3, 5, ∗)) example in the previous
section, suppose that the third party is contacted for recon-
struction. If the party belongs to recovery set of size d1 = 5,
then a1 = 2 qudits are communicated to the combiner.
Similarly, if d2 = 4, then a2 = 3 and if d3 = 3, then all
the a3 = 6 qudits are sent.
The secret reconstruction happens in two stages. First, the
basis states of the secret are reconstructed through suitable
unitary operations. The classical secret sharing schemes stop
the reconstruction at this point. But, the qudits containing the
basis states of the secret can be entangled with the remaining
qudits. So, in the second stage, the secret is extracted into a
set of qudits that are disentangled with the remaining qudits.
Lemma 1 (Secret recovery). For a ((k, 2k − 1, ∗)) scheme
with the encoding given in Eq. (8), we can recover the secret
from any d = 2k − i shares where 1 ≤ i ≤ k by accessing
only the first ai =
m
d−k+1 qudits from each share where m is
as in Eq. (6).
Proof. Each of the d participants sends their first ai qudits
to the combiner for reconstructing the secret. Let D =
{j1, j2, . . . , jd} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 2k − 1} be the set of d shares
chosen and E = {jd+1, jd+2, . . . , j2k−1} be the complement
of D. Then, Eq. (8) can be rearranged as∑
r∈F
m(k−1)
q
|cj1,1cj2,1...cjd,1〉 |cj1,2cj2,2...cjd,2〉
. . . |cj1,acj2,a...cjd,a〉
|cjd+1,1cjd+2,1...cjn,1〉 |cjd+1,2cjd+2,2...cjn,2〉
. . . |cjd+1,acjd+2,a...cjn,a〉
|c1,a+1c2,a+1...cn,a+1〉 |c1,a+2c2,a+2...cn,a+2〉
. . . |c1,mc2,m...cn,m〉 (9)
where we have highlighted (in blue) the basis states of
the qudits communicated to the combiner. For the sake of
exposition we will first cover the case of i = 1 i.e. di = 2k−1
where all the parties are contacted for their first a1 qudits by
the combiner.
Case (i): i = 1
For i = 1, d = 2k − 1 = n. Now Eq. (9) can be rewritten as∑
r∈F
m(k−1)
q
|V (S,R1)〉 |V (0, D1, R2)〉 |V (0, D2, R3)〉
. . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
Since V is an n × n Vandermonde matrix and therefore
invertible, we can apply V −1 to the state |V (S,R1)〉 and
rearrange the qudits to obtain
|S〉
∑
r∈F
m(k−1)
q
|R1〉 |V (0, D1, R2)〉 |V (0, D2, R3)〉
. . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉 .
We can clearly see that the secret is unentangled with the rest
of the qudits. Therefore, we can recover arbitrary superposi-
tions also.
Case (ii): 2 ≤ i ≤ k: Under this case, the state of
the system is as follows. (This is the same as Eq. (9), only the
qudits in possession of the combiner have been rearranged
and highlighted.)
∑
r∈
F
m(k−1)
q
|VD(S,R1)〉 |VD(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VD(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
=
∑
r∈
F
m(k−1)
q
|VD(S,R1)〉 |VD
[2,n](D1, R2)〉 . . . |VD
[i,n](Di−1, Ri)〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
Since VD
[i,n] is a di × di Vandermonde matrix and therefore
invertible, the combiner can apply the inverse of VD
[i,n] to
|V
[i,n]
D (Di−1, Ri)〉 to transform the state as follows.∑
r∈F
m(k−1)
q
|VD(S,R1)〉 |VD
[2,n](D1, R2)〉
. . . |VD
[i−1,n](Di−2, Ri−1)〉 |Di−1〉 |Ri〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
Note that the matrix Di−1 contains elements from the (i−1)th
row of Ri−1. Rearranging the qudits, we get
∑
r∈
F
m(k−1)
q
|VD(S,R1)〉 |VD
[2,n](D1, R2)〉 . . . |VD
[i−2,n](Di−3, Ri−2)〉
|Wi−1(Di−2, Ri−1)〉 |Di−1\Ri−1〉 |Ri〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
where Wℓ = [VD
[ℓ,n]t wℓ,k+1 wℓ,k+2 . . . wℓ,k+i−ℓ]
t for 1 ≤
ℓ ≤ i − 1 where wℓ,j is a column vector of length (2k − ℓ)
with one in the jth position and zeros elsewhere. Wℓ is a
(2k − ℓ) × (2k − ℓ) full-rank matrix and invertible. We have
split the state |Di−1〉 as |Di−1 \Ri−1〉 |Di−1 ∩Ri−1〉. Then
we merge |Di−1 ∩Ri−1〉 with |V
[i−1,n]
D (Di−2, Ri−1)〉 to give
|Wi−1(Di−2, Ri−1)〉.
Now applying W−1i−1 to the state |Wi−1(Di−2, Ri−1)〉, we
are able to extract Di−2 and Ri−1 as shown below:
∑
r∈F
m(k−1)
q
|VD(S,R1)〉 |VD
[2,n](D1, R2)〉
. . . |VD
[i−2,n](Di−3, Ri−2)〉
|Di−2〉 |Ri−1〉 |Di−1\Ri−1〉 |Ri〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
Now we repeat the process with Di−2 and Ri−2 to extract
Di−3 and Ri−2. Rearranging the qudits, we obtain,∑
r∈F
m(k−1)
q
|VD(S,R1)〉 |VD
[2,n](D1, R2)〉
. . . |Wi−2(Di−3, Ri−2)〉
|Di−2\Ri−2〉 |Ri−1〉 |Di−1\{Ri−1, Ri−2}〉 |Ri〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
Repeating this process for all Di−3, Ri−2 through D1, R2 and
S,R1, and applying the inverses of Wi−3,Wi−4, . . .W1 in
successive steps to the suitable sets of qudits and rearranging,
we obtain,
|S〉
∑
r∈
F
m(k−1)
q
|R1〉 |R2〉 |R3〉 . . . |Ri〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
Let Jℓ = [ℓ− 1]∪ [ℓ+1, k− 1] for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ i− 1. Since Di−1
is formed from the (i − 1)th rows of R1, R2, . . . , Ri−1, the
qudits can be rearranged to obtain,
|S〉
∑
r∈
F
m(k−1)
q
|R1,Ji−1〉 |R2,Ji−1〉 . . . |Ri−1,Ji−1〉 |Di−1〉 |Ri〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
Consider the matrix
Gℓ =


Ik−i+ℓ 0
V
[i−ℓ+1,n]
E
0 Ik−i

 . (10)
Gℓ is a (di+ ℓ− 1)× (di+ ℓ− 1) invertible matrix. Applying
G1 on |Di−1〉 |Ri〉, we obtain,
|S〉
∑
r∈
F
m(k−1)
q
|R1,Ji−1〉 |R2,Ji−1〉 . . . |Ri−1,Ji−1〉
|Di−1〉 |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉 |Ri,[i,k−1]〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
Now, this can be rearranged to get
|S〉
∑
(R1,R2,...Ri−1,
Ri,[i,k−1],
Ri+1...Rk)
∈F
m(k−1)−(i−1)bi
q
|R1〉 |R2〉 . . . |Ri−1〉 |Ri,[i,k−1]〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉
. . . |VE(0, Di−2, Ri−1)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉∑
Ri,[i−1]
∈F
(i−1)bi
q
|VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉 |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
= |S〉
∑
(R1,R2,...Ri−1,
Ri,[i,k−1],
Ri+1...Rk)
∈F
m(k−1)−(i−1)bi
q
|R1〉 |R2〉 . . . |Ri−1〉 |Ri,[i,k−1]〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉
. . . |VE(0, Di−2, Ri−1)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉∑
Ti∈F
(i−1)bi
q
|Ti〉 |Ti〉
because the state
∑
Ri,[i−1]
∈F
(i−1)×bi
q
|VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉 |VE(0, Di−1, Ri)〉
is a uniform superposition of states |Ti〉 |Ti〉 over
Ti ∈ F
(i−1)×bi
q independent of the value of Di−1 and
Ri,[i,k−1].
Since Di−2 is formed from the (i − 2)th rows of
R1, R2, . . . , Ri−2, the qudits can be rearranged to obtain,
|S〉
∑
r∈
F
m(k−1)
q
|R1,Ji−2〉 |R2,Ji−2〉 . . . |Ri−2,Ji−2〉
|Di−2〉 |Ri−1〉 |Ri,[i,k−1]〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−2, Ri−1)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉∑
Ti∈F
(i−1)bi
q
|Ti〉 |Ti〉
Applying G2 on |Di−2〉 |Ri−1〉, we obtain,
|S〉
∑
r∈
F
m(k−1)
q
|R1,Ji−2〉 |R2,Ji−2〉 . . . |Ri−2,Ji−2〉
|Di−2〉 |VE(0, Di−2, Ri−1)〉 |Ri−1,[i,k−1]〉 |Ri,[i,k−1]〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉 . . . |VE(0, Di−2, Ri−1)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉∑
Ti∈F
(i−1)bi
q
|Ti〉 |Ti〉
Now, this can be rearranged to get
|S〉
∑
(R1,R2,...Ri−1,
Ri,[i,k−1],
Ri+1...Rk)
∈F
m(k−1)−(i−1)bi
q
|R1〉 |R2〉 . . . |Ri−2〉 |Ri−1,[i,k−1]〉 |Ri,[i,k−1]〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉
. . . |VE(0, Di−3, Ri−2)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉∑
Ri,[i−1]
∈F
(i−1)×bi
q
|VE(0, Di−2, Ri−1)〉 |VE(0, Di−2, Ri−1)〉
∑
Ti∈F
(i−1)bi
q
|Ti〉 |Ti〉
= |S〉
∑
(R1,R2,...Ri−1,
Ri,[i,k−1],
Ri+1...Rk)
∈F
m(k−1)−(i−1)bi
q
|R1〉 |R2〉 . . . |Ri−2〉 |Ri−1,[i,k−1]〉 |Ri,[i,k−1]〉
|VE(S,R1)〉 |VE(0, D1, R2)〉
. . . |VE(0, Di−3, Ri−2)〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉∑
Ti−1∈F
(i−1)×bi−1
q
|Ti−1〉 |Ti−1〉
∑
Ti∈F
(i−1)×bi
q
|Ti〉 |Ti〉
Performing similar operations with |Rj〉 for 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 2,
we obtain,
|S〉
∑
(Ri+1...Rk)
∈F
(m−ai)(k−1)
q
(R1,[i,k−1],...Ri,[i,k−1])
∈F
(k−i)ai
q
|R1,[i,k−1]〉 |R2,[i,k−1]〉 . . . |Ri,[i,k−1]〉
|V (0, Di, Ri+1)〉 . . . |V (0, Dk−1, Rk)〉
∑
T1∈
F
(i−1)×b1
q
|T1〉 |T1〉
∑
T2∈
F
(i−1)×b2
q
|T2〉 |T2〉 . . .
∑
Ti∈
F
(i−1)×bi
q
|Ti〉 |Ti〉
At this point the secret is completely disentangled with the
rest of the qudits and the recovery is complete.
C. Secrecy
In the scheme given by Eq. (8), the combiner can recover the
secret by accessing k parties (from case (ii) when i = k in the
proof of Lemma 1). So, by No-cloning theorem, the remaining
k− 1 parties in the scheme should have no information about
the secret. Thus, this scheme satisfies the secrecy property.
Alternatively, we can invoke [13, Theorem 5] to show that
the secrecy requirement is met since all unauthorized sets are
complements of authorized sets in a threshold scheme. With
these results in place we have our central contribution.
Theorem 1 (Existence of universal QTS). There exists a QTS
with the parameters ((k, 2k − 1, ∗)) such that for all values
of 1 ≤ i ≤ k when any di = 2k − i parties are contacted by
the combiner, the secret can be recovered from m
di−k+1
qudits
received from each of the di shares, where the secret contains
m qudits as in Eq. (6).
In the standard ((k, n)) QTS, the secret can be recovered
when the combiner communicates with k parties. Here, if the
secret is of size m qudits, then the number of qudits com-
municated to the combiner is km qudits. The communication
cost per secret qudit is k qudits.
In the ((k, n, d)) communication efficient QSS of [20], the
secret can be recovered when the combiner contacts k parties
and receiving km′ qudits wherem′ = d−k+1. This leads to a
cost of k qudits per secret qudit. However, when the combiner
contacts d parties, where k < d ≤ n is a fixed value, the secret
can be recovered with a communication cost of dm
′
d−k+1 qudits.
The cost per qudit is d
d−k+1 which is strictly less than k.
In the ((k, n, ∗)) universal QTS, the secret can be recovered
by the combiner by accessing any di parties, where the number
of parties accessed given by k ≤ di ≤ n is chosen by
the combiner. For the chosen value of di, the secret can
be recovered by downloading dim
di−k+1
qudits. The per qudit
communication cost is di
di−k+1
which is same as that of [20].
However, we are able to achieve this for all di using the same
scheme and not fixing di apriori.
APPENDIX
EXAMPLE FOR ((3, 5, ∗)) COMMUNICATION EFFICIENT QTS
A. Parameters
Take k = 3. From Eq. (6), the parameters for the construc-
tion can be calculated as given below.
n = 2k − 1 = 5, q = 7 (11a)
d ∈ {d1, d2, d3} (11b)
d1 = 5, d2 = 4, d3 = 3 (11c)
m1 = 3,m2 = 2,m3 = 1 (11d)
m = lcm{m1,m2,m3} = 6 (11e)
a1 = 2, a2 = 3, a3 = 6 (11f)
b1 = 2, b2 = 1, b3 = 3 (11g)
A secret of six qudits will be encoded into thirty qudits,
giving six qudits for each party. Every qudit is of dimension
7.
B. Encoding
Encoding for this scheme can be given by the mapping
|s1s2s3s4s5s6〉 7→
∑
r∈F127
|c1,1c1,2c1,3c1,4c1,5c1,6〉
|c2,1c2,2c2,3c2,4c2,5c2,6〉
|c3,1c3,2c3,3c3,4c3,5c3,6〉
|c4,1c4,2c4,3c4,4c4,5c4,6〉
|c5,1c5,2c5,3c5,4c5,5c5,6〉
(12)
where cij is the (i, j)th entry of the matrix C = VM and V ,
M are given below
V =


1 1 1 1 1
1 2 4 1 2
1 3 2 6 4
1 4 2 1 4
1 5 4 6 2

 , (13)
M =


s1 s4 0 0 0 0
s2 s5 r1 0 0 0
s3 s6 r3 r2 r4 r6
r1 r3 r5 r7 r9 r11
r2 r4 r6 r8 r10 r12

 . (14)
Given these matrices V and M , for this ((3, 5, ∗)) scheme,
the encoded state in Eq. (12) can be rewritten rearranging the
qudits as follows. (With respect to Eq. (12), we have grouped
the ith qudits of each party in the ith row below.)
∑
r∈F127
|c1,1c2,1c3,1c4,1c5,1〉
|c1,2c2,2c3,2c4,2c5,2〉
|c1,3c2,3c3,3c4,3c5,3〉
|c1,4c2,4c3,4c4,4c5,4〉
|c1,5c2,5c3,5c4,5c5,5〉
|c1,6c2,6c3,6c4,6c5,6〉
=
∑
r∈F127
|V (s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V (s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|V [2,5](r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉 .
(15)
For completeness, we give below the the encoded state in
Eq. (12).
∑
(r1,r2,...r12)
∈F127
|s1 + s2 + s3 + r1 + r2〉
|s4 + s5 + s6 + r3 + r4〉
|r1 + r3 + r5 + r6〉
|r2 + r7 + r8〉
|r4 + r9 + r10〉
|r6 + r11 + r12〉
|s1 + 2s2 + 4s3 + r1 + 2r2〉
|s4 + 2s5 + 4s6 + r3 + 2r4〉
|2r1 + 4r3 + r5 + 2r6〉
|4r2 + r7 + 2r8〉
|4r4 + r9 + 2r10〉
|4r6 + r11 + 2r12〉
|s1 + 3s2 + 2s3 + 6r1 + 4r2〉
|s4 + 3s5 + 2s6 + 6r3 + 4r4〉
|3r1 + 2r3 + 6r5 + 4r6〉
|2r2 + 6r7 + 4r8〉
|2r4 + 6r9 + 4r10〉
|2r6 + 6r11 + 4r12〉
|s1 + 4s2 + 2s3 + r1 + 4r2〉
|s4 + 4s5 + 2s6 + r3 + 4r4〉
|4r1 + 2r3 + r5 + 4r6〉
|2r2 + r7 + 4r8〉
|2r4 + r9 + 4r10〉
|2r6 + r11 + 4r12〉
|s1 + 5s2 + 4s3 + 6r1 + 2r2〉
|s4 + 5s5 + 4s6 + 6r3 + 2r4〉
|5r1 + 4r3 + 6r5 + 2r6〉
|4r2 + 6r7 + 2r8〉
|4r4 + 6r9 + 2r10〉
|4r6 + 6r11 + 2r12〉
C. Secret Recovery
For the encoding scheme given in Eq. (12), we can recover
the secret from a subset of size d ∈ {3, 4, 5}. When d =
3, each of the three accessed parties need to send all its six
qudits. When d = 4, each of the four accessed parties need
to send only its first three qudits. When d = 5, each of the
five accessed parties need to send only its first two qudits. We
now show how to recover the secret for various sizes of the
authorized set.
Case 1 : d = 5
In this case, each of the five accessed parties sends only
its first two qudits. Then the encoded state in Eq. (15) can
be rewritten as follows. (The basis states corresponding to the
qudits accessed by the combiner are indicated in blue here.)
∑
r∈F127
|c1,1c2,1 . . . c5,1〉
|c1,2c2,2 . . . c5,2〉
|c1,3c2,3 . . . c5,3〉
|c1,4c2,4 . . . c5,4〉
|c1,5c2,5 . . . c5,5〉
|c1,6c2,6 . . . c5,6〉
=
∑
r∈F127
|V (s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V (s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|V [2,5](r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
Now, apply V −1 to the first qudits of the five parties and then
apply V −1 to the second qudits of the five parties to obtain
∑
r∈F127
|s1, s2, s3, r1, r2〉
|s4, s5, s6, r3, r4〉
|V [2,5](r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉 .
On rearranging the qudits, we obtain the secret containing six
qudits.
|s1s2s3s4s5s6〉
∑
r∈F127
|r1, r2〉
|r3, r4〉
|V [2,5](r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
Here, we have recovered any given basis state in the secret
without any information leaking to the other qudits. Hence,
the secret, which is an arbitrary superposition of the basis
states, can also be recovered by the above operation.
Case 2 : d = 4
Assume that the first four parties have been accessed by
the combiner. Secret recovery for any other set of four parties
will also happen in a similar way. In this case, each of the
four accessed parties sends only its first three qudits. Then the
encoded state can be rewritten as follows.
∑
r∈F127
|c1,1c2,1c3,1c4,1〉 |c5,1〉
|c1,2c2,2c3,2c4,2〉 |c5,2〉
|c1,3c2,3c3,3c4,3〉 |c5,3〉
|c1,4c2,4c3,4c4,4c5,4〉
|c1,5c2,5c3,5c4,5c5,5〉
|c1,6c2,6c3,6c4,6c5,6〉
=
∑
r∈F127
|V[4](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V[4](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|V
[2,5]
[4] (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 |V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
The secret recovery happens in two parts. In the first part,
we extract the basis state |s1s2s3s4s5s6〉. In the second part,
we disentangle the qudits containing the basis state from the
remaining qudits.
1) To recover |r1〉 and |r3〉, apply V
[2,5]
[4]
−1
to
|V
[2,5]
[4] (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 to obtain
∑
r∈F127
|V[4](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V[4](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r1〉 |r3〉 |r5〉 |r6〉 |V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉 .
Here, |V[4](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |r1〉 = |W1(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
and |V[4](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |r3〉 = |W1(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
where
W1 =
[
V[4]
0 0 0 1 0
]
.
2) To recover |s1s2s3s4s5s6〉, apply W
−1
1 to the qudits
|V[4](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |r1〉 and then apply W
−1
1 to the qudits
|V[4](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |r3〉 to obtain
∑
r∈F127
|s1, s2, s3〉 |r1〉 |V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|s4, s5, s6〉 |r3〉 |V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r2〉 |r4〉 |r5〉 |r6〉 |V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V (0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉 .
At this stage part of the |s1, s2, s3〉 |s4, s5, s6〉
has been successfully extracted into a separate
register. But |s1, s2, s3〉 is still entangled with
|V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |r1〉 |r2〉 and |s4, s5, s6〉 is entangled
with |V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |r3〉 |r4〉. Further, |r1〉 and |r3〉
are entangled with |r5〉 |V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉.
3) Consider the square matrix
G1 =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
V
[2,5]
{5}
0 0 0 1

 .
Now, apply G1 to |r1〉 |r3〉 |r5〉 |r6〉 to obtain,
∑
r∈F127
|s1, s2, s3〉 |r1〉 |V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|s4, s5, s6〉 |r3〉 |V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r2〉 |r4〉 |V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 |r6〉 |V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
Rearranging the qudits, we obtain
∑
(r1,r2...r4,
r6,r7...r12)
∈F117
|s1, s2, s3〉 |r1〉 |V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|s4, s5, s6〉 |r3〉 |V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r2〉 |r4〉 |r6〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
(16)
∑
r5∈F7
|V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 |V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
For any given values of r1, r3 and r6, the superposition of
|V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 |V
[2,5]
{5} (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 over all values of
r5 ∈ F7 will give the uniform superposition |0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉+
. . . + |6〉 |6〉, which is independent of r1, r3 and r6. Hence,
(16) can be simplified as
=
∑
(r1,r2...r4,
r6,r7...r12)
∈F117
|s1, s2, s3〉 |r1〉 |V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|s4, s5, s6〉 |r3〉 |V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r2〉 |r4〉 |r6〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉∑
f5∈F7
|f5〉 |f5〉
4) Consider the square matrix
G2 =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
V{5}
0 0 0 0 1

 .
Now, apply G2 to |s1, s2, s3〉 |r1〉 |r2〉 and then apply G2 to
|s4, s5, s6〉 |r3〉 |r4〉 to obtain,
∑
(r1,r2...r4,
r6,r7...r12)
∈F117
|s1, s2, s3〉 |V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|s4, s5, s6〉 |V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r2〉 |r4〉 |r6〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉∑
f5∈F7
|f5〉 |f5〉
Rearranging the qudits, we obtain
|s1s2s3s4s5s6〉
∑
(r2,r4,
r6,r7...r12)
∈F97
|r2〉 |r4〉 |r6〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
(17)
∑
r1∈F7
|V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉∑
r3∈F7
|V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉∑
f5∈F7
|f5〉 |f5〉
Similar to the argument below (16), it can
be proved that both the superposition of
|V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |V{5}(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
over all values of r1 and the superposition of
|V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |V{5}(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 over all
values of r3 will give |0〉 |0〉 + |1〉 |1〉+ . . .+ |6〉 |6〉. Hence,
(17) can be simplified as
|s1s2s3s4s5s6〉
∑
(r1,r2...r4,
r6,r7...r12)
∈F97
|r2〉 |r4〉 |r6〉
|V (0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V (0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V (0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
∑
f1∈F7
|f1〉 |f1〉
∑
f3∈F7
|f3〉 |f3〉
∑
f5∈F7
|f5〉 |f5〉
Here, we have completely disentangled the basis states of the
secret from the remaining qudits. Hence, any arbitrary linear
superposition of the basis states can be recovered by the above
operations.
Case 3 : d = 3
Assume that the first three parties have been accessed by
the combiner. Secret recovery for any other set of three parties
will also happen in a similar way. In this case, each of the three
accessed parties sends all its six qudits. Then the encoded state
can be rewritten as follows.
∑
r∈F127
|c1,1c2,1c3,1〉 |c4,1c5,1〉
|c1,2c2,2c3,2〉 |c4,2c5,2〉
|c1,3c2,3c3,3〉 |c4,3c5,3〉
|c1,4c2,4c3,4〉 |c4,4c5,4〉
|c1,5c2,5c3,5〉 |c4,5c5,5〉
|c1,6c2,6c3,6〉 |c4,6c5,6〉
=
∑
r∈F127
|V[3](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V[3](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|V
[2,5]
[3] (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 |V[4,5](0, r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V
[3,5]
[3] (r2, r7, r8)〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|V
[3,5]
[3] (r4, r9, r10)〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|V
[3,5]
[3] (r6, r11, r12)〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉 .
Similar to d = 3 case, the secret recovery happens in two
parts. First, we will recover the basis state and then we will
remove the entanglement with other qudits.
1) To recover |r2〉 |r4〉 |r6〉, apply V
[3,5]
[3]
−1
to
|V
[3,5]
[3] (r2, r7, r8)〉, then to |V
[3,5]
[3] (r4, r9, r10)〉 and then
to |V
[3,5]
[3] (r6, r11, r12)〉 to obtain
∑
r∈F127
|V[3](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V[3](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|V
[2,5]
[3] (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 |V[4,5](0, r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|r2〉 |r7〉 |r8〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|r4〉 |r9〉 |r10〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|r6〉 |r11〉 |r12〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
Here |V
[2,5]
[3] (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 |r6〉 = |W2(r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 where
W2 =
[
V
[2,5]
[3]
0 0 0 1
]
2) To recover |r1〉 and |r3〉, apply W2
−1 to the qudits
|V
[2,5]
[3] (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉 |r6〉 to obtain
∑
r∈F127
|V[3](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V[3](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r1〉 |r3〉 |r5〉 |V[4,5](0, r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|r2〉 |r7〉 |r8〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|r4〉 |r9〉 |r10〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|r6〉 |r11〉 |r12〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
Here |V[3](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |r1〉 |r2〉 =
|W2(s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 and |V[3](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |r3〉 |r4〉 =
|W2(s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 where
W2 =

 V[3]0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


3) To recover |s1, s2, s3〉 and |s4, s5, s6〉, apply
W−12 to |V[3](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |r1〉 |r2〉 and then to
|V[3](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉 |r3〉 |r4〉 to obtain,
∑
r∈F127
|s1〉 |s2〉 |s3〉 |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|s4〉 |s5〉 |s6〉 |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r1〉 |r3〉 |r5〉 |V[4,5](0, r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|r2〉 |r7〉 |r8〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉
|r4〉 |r9〉 |r10〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉
|r6〉 |r11〉 |r12〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉
. The basis state |s1s2s3s4s5s6〉 has been successfully
recovered. But still it is entangled with other qudits.
4) |r2〉 is entangled with |r7〉 |r8〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r2, r7, r8)〉,
|r4〉 is entangled with |r9〉 |r10〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r4, r9, r10)〉 and
|r6〉 is entangled with |r11〉 |r12〉 |V[4,5](0, 0, r6, r11, r12)〉.
These entanglements will be removed in this step. Consider
the matrix
G1 =
[
1 0 0
V
[3,5]
[4,5]
]
Apply G1 to |r2〉 |r7〉 |r8〉, then to |r4〉 |r9〉 |r10〉 and then to
|r6〉 |r11〉 |r12〉 to obtain,
∑
r∈F127
|s1〉 |s2〉 |s3〉 |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|s4〉 |s5〉 |s6〉 |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r1〉 |r3〉 |r5〉 |V[4,5](0, r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|r2〉 |V
[3,5]
[4,5] (r2, r7, r8)〉 |V
[3,5]
[4,5] (r2, r7, r8)〉
|r4〉 |V
[3,5]
[4,5] (r4, r9, r10)〉 |V
[3,5]
[4,5] (r4, r9, r10)〉
|r6〉 |V
[3,5]
[4,5] (r6, r11, r12)〉 |V
[3,5]
[4,5] (r6, r11, r12)〉
(18)
Using arguments similar to those under (16), the state in (18)
can be simplified as
∑
(r1,r2...r6
f7,f8...f12)
∈F127
|s1〉 |s2〉 |s3〉 |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|s4〉 |s5〉 |s6〉 |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r1〉 |r3〉 |r5〉 |V[4,5](0, r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|r2〉 |f7, f8〉 |f7, f8〉
|r4〉 |f9, f10〉 |f9, f10〉
|r6〉 |f11, f12〉 |f11, f12〉
Rearranging the qudits, we obtain
|s1s2s3s4s5s6〉
∑
(r1,r2...r6
f7,f8...f12)
∈F127
|r1〉 |r2〉 |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|r3〉 |r4〉 |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r5〉 |r6〉 |V[4,5](0, r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|f7, f8〉 |f7, f8〉
|f9, f10〉 |f9, f10〉
|f11, f12〉 |f11, f12〉
5) |r1〉 and |r3〉 are entangled with |r5〉 |r6〉
|V[4,5](0, r1, r3, r5, r6)〉. This entanglement will be removed
here. Consider the matrix
G2 =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
V
[2,5]
[4,5]


Apply G2 to |r1〉 |r3〉 |r5〉 |r6〉 to obtain
|s1s2s3s4s5s6〉
∑
(r1,r2...r6
f7,f8...f12)
∈F127
|r1〉 |r2〉 |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|r3〉 |r4〉 |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|V
[2,5]
[4,5] (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|V
[2,5]
[4,5] (r1, r3, r5, r6)〉
|f7, f8〉 |f7, f8〉
|f9, f10〉 |f9, f10〉
|f11, f12〉 |f11, f12〉
= |s1s2s3s4s5s6〉
∑
(r1,r2...r4
f5,f6...f12)
∈F127
|r1〉 |r2〉 |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|r3〉 |r4〉 |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|f5, f6〉 |f5, f6〉
|f7, f8〉 |f7, f8〉
|f9, f10〉 |f9, f10〉
|f11, f12〉 |f11, f12〉
6) |s1, s2, s3〉 is entangled with |V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉 |r1〉
|r2〉 and |s4, s5, s6〉 is entangled with |V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|r3〉 |r4〉. Consider the matrix
G3 =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
V[4,5]


Now, apply G3 to |s1s2s3〉 |r1〉 |r2〉 and then to
|s4s5s6〉 |r3〉 |r4〉 to obtain
|s1s2s3s4s5s6〉
∑
(r1,r2...r4
f5,f6...f12)
∈F127
|V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V[4,5](s1, s2, s3, r1, r2)〉
|V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|V[4,5](s4, s5, s6, r3, r4)〉
|f5, f6〉 |f5, f6〉
|f7, f8〉 |f7, f8〉
|f9, f10〉 |f9, f10〉
|f11, f12〉 |f11, f12〉
= |s1s2s3s4s5s6〉
∑
(f1,f2...f12)
∈F127
|f1, f2〉 |f1, f2〉
|f3, f4〉 |f3, f4〉
|f5, f6〉 |f5, f6〉
|f7, f8〉 |f7, f8〉
|f9, f10〉 |f9, f10〉
|f11, f12〉 |f11, f12〉
Here, we have recovered any given basis state in the secret
without any entanglement to the other qudits. Hence, the secret
can be recovered by the above operations.
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